



SNISMUN VII

HCC

BACKGROUND GUIDE



HISTORIC CRISIS COMMITTEE (HCC)

The Great Columbian Narco War (Freeze Date: 27th November 1989)

Letter from the Executive Board Dear Delegates,

It is with great enthusiasm that we welcome you to the Historic Crisis Committee at SNIS ModelUnited Nations 2026. By choosing to be a part of this committee, you have placed yourself at the center of one of the most engaging and fast-paced simulations MUN has to offer. Here, every decision you make and every directive you draft has the power to alter the course of events. We hope this experience not only challenges your intellect but also strengthens your ability to lead under pressure and think creatively in moments of uncertainty. This Background Guide has been carefully curated to give you a structured overview of the committee and its themes. It is the result of extensive research from verified sources, combined with the perspectives and expertise of the Executive Board. Please keep in mind that the material presented here is meant as a foundation and does not represent the personal views of the Board members. Nor is it intended to provide an exhaustive account of every possible angle such as your independent research, analysis, and creativity will be key to success in this committee. As this is a Crisis Committee, unpredictability is part of the design. The dynamic nature of crises means you must stay alert, adapt quickly, and approach challenges with both strategy and innovation. We urge you to familiarize yourselves with the crisis procedures provided, as they will form the backbone of your committee experience. We are confident that your time in this committee will push you to think beyond the conventional, collaborate with others in meaningful ways, and sharpen your skills as both negotiators and leaders. Should you have any doubts or require guidance, please do not hesitate to reach out to us through the contact details provided, we will be happy to assist. On behalf of the Executive Board, we wish you the very best in your preparation and look forward to the energy and insight you will bring to this committee. May your experience here be both rewarding and inspiring.

The Executive Board



HCC

Introduction to the Committee:

Origins and establishment :

The Historic Crisis Committee (HCC) at SNIS Model United Nations 2026 is designed to push delegates into one of the most demanding and unpredictable formats of Model UN. Unlike conventional committees, where the flow of debate is shaped primarily by static documents and drafted resolutions, a crisis committee is in constant motion. Every communiqué, directive, and speech has the potential to alter the landscape of the simulation, producing ripple effects that extend far beyond the immediate agenda item.

What sets a Historic Crisis Committee apart is its emphasis on persistence and adaptability. The story does not unfold in neatly separated “updates” with long pauses; rather, it progresses in near-real time, demanding delegates to react to evolving scenarios as they happen. The instant a crisis is solved, another can arise, demanding constant attention, ad-hoc responses, and strategic vision.

For the delegates, this implies two things. First, you will not just speak for your portfolio's interests but also need to predict the actions of allies and opponents, strategizing not only for short-term outcomes but survival in an evolving geopolitical landscape. Second, you should be willing to use the entire range of crisis instruments, from instructions and announcements to press statements and requests for portfolios in order to be ahead of events. Victory in the CCC does not result from simply responding to events, but from molding them, guiding history down paths that lead to results in your favor.

The Great Colombian Narco War provides an ideal setting for such a simulation. Far from being a purely law enforcement or military conflict, it is a complex struggle shaped by powerful drug cartels, guerrilla insurgencies, paramilitary organizations, political violence, institutional corruption, foreign intervention, and deep socio-economic inequalities. The CCC allows delegates to engage with these interconnected challenges in real time: planning counter-narcotics operations, dismantling trafficking networks, negotiating or confronting armed factions, strengthening state institutions, coordinating between domestic and international actors, and responding to rapidly evolving crises. As events unfold, delegates will have the opportunity to influence the course of the conflict, shape Colombia's national security strategy, and perhaps even alter the future of the country's decades-long battle against narcotics and organized crime.



Introduction to the Agenda :

The Great Colombian Narco War thrusts delegates into the heart of a brutal and era-defining conflict, as the Colombian state faces an existential threat from exceptionally well-funded and structured drug syndicates. As 1989 draws to a close, the nation has emerged as the global nexus of the cocaine industry. The Medellín Cartel, in particular, leverages its vast capital and shadow networks to wage a campaign of terror - utilizing explosives, political executions, and systemic intimidation to paralyze the government and destabilize civil society. In response, the state remains under relentless strain, struggling to uproot these criminal enterprises while protecting its fragile democratic foundations from total collapse. By late 1989, the confrontation had reached a fever pitch. The cold-blooded murder of Luis Carlos Galán in August and the subsequent mid-air destruction of Avianca Flight 203 in November have underscored the cartels' absolute disregard for human life and state sovereignty. The administration of President Virgilio Barco has pivoted toward a policy of total war, prioritizing the extradition of narco-terrorists and the restoration of public order. Meanwhile, traffickers remain committed to a strategy of violent resistance, aiming to coerce the government into submission. This volatile landscape is further complicated by the divergent agendas of the Cali Cartel, guerrilla factions, right-wing paramilitaries, and a heavy-handed presence from international intelligence and military actors. With a Freeze Date established for 27th November 1989, delegates must operate within a nation teetering on the edge of catastrophe. In this Historic Crisis Committee, your strategic foresight and immediate reactions will dictate the outcome of this struggle, determining whether the Colombian state survives or if the narco-cartels succeed in reshaping the country's destiny forever.

Historical Context:

Violence origins: La Violencia and rural instability (1948 – 1970s)

The Colombian state was destabilized by weak institutions and a long history of partisanship, not by the cocaine industry. Murder of Liberal candidate for presidency Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Bogotá in 1948 led to the Bogotazo riots and a ten years civil war between Liberals and Conservatives called “La Violencia,” which killed 200,000 to 300,000 people. To stop the violence, elites agreed on the creation of National Front in 1957, and that Liberals and Conservatives would take turns occupying the presidency and sharing governmental positions equally for sixteen years. Although this agreement prevented violent clashes, it established an extremely restrictive monopoly of the two parties and left everyone else out of politics. Neglected rural areas organized armed resistance in self-defense enclaves. Military campaigns like Marquetalia (1964) forced surviving insurgents to form guerrilla movements such as FARC and ELN.

Cocaine Boom and Rise of Narco-Cartels (1970 - 1984)

In the mid-1970s, due to increased demand for cocaine in the USA, the process of drug smuggling changed into international criminal activities involving billions of dollars. The following two drug trafficking organizations were established and became dominant in this period:

→ The Medellín Cartel, headed by Pablo Escobar, Gustavo Gaviria, Carlos Lehder, José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, and the Ochoa brothers. The Medellín Cartel is a brutal and militarized organization that used violence, mass production, philanthropic actions such as “Medellín Sin Tugurios”, and intimidations to establish logistic superiority.

→ The Cali Cartel, controlled by Rodríguez Orejuela brothers and José Santacruz Londoño. The Cali Cartel is an organized and systematic business that used systematic corruption and shell corporations but no violence and publicity.

As cartels seized rural land for drug processing laboratories, they found themselves in confrontation with guerrilla groups extorting taxes on coca cultivation. As a result of kidnapping Martha Nieves Ochoa in 1981 by the M-19 guerrillas, the traffickers established MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores / Death to Kidnappers), which laid the ground for the emergence of paramilitary organizations on the right, sponsored by narco-capital.

The Extradition Crisis and "Los Extraditables" (1984–1988)

The main problem during the war was the 1977 U.S.–Colombia Extradition Treaty. The problem of extradition was mortal for cartel leaders because the prisons of Colombia were vulnerable to bribes and attacks, but the courts and federal prisons of the United States were untouchable. In 1983, Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla denounced Escobar's criminal activities and deprived him of parliamentary mandate. Escobar responded by killing Lara Bonilla in April 1984. President Belisario Betancur in response used the extradition treaty, which led to the war between the state and Medellín Cartel. Cartel leaders organized "Los Extraditables" and launched narco-terrorism campaign with the slogan: "We prefer a grave in Colombia to a prison in the United States."

During the following four years, Los Extraditables targeted the very roots of Colombia's democracy, assassinating Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos, kidnapping important figures like politician Andrés Pastrana, bombing the offices of El Espectador newspaper with a truck bomb, and threatening judges in order to render extradition ineffective.

Flashpoint August 1989: The Murder of Luis Carlos Galán

The situation came to a head on August 18, 1989, when prominent presidential candidate and the man considered Colombia's greatest anti-corruption campaigner and a supporter of extradition, Luis Carlos Galán was killed while addressing a rally in Soacha. Galán's murder prompted the government of Colombia to resort to all-out war. President Virgilio Barco established a State of Siege in Colombia pursuant to Article 121 of the Constitution, and also ordered executive orders permitting administrative extradition and asset forfeiture, deploying the Search Bloc (Bloque de Búsqueda), supported by the U.S. DEA and military intelligence.

SITUATION UPTO 27TH NOVEMBER, 1989

Colombia was on the brink of a breakdown by late November 1989. There was a war going on against narco-terrorism in cities in Colombia, where sicarios of Escobar were murdering policemen in Medellín; there were frequent threats of bombing for government infrastructure, and security of the civilians had been breached. At the same time, the military offensive carried out by the government had reached its peak and Cali Cartel had invaded the Medellín market.

Timeline of events

9th April, 1948 – Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán is assassinated in Bogotá. His murder sparks the Bogotazo, a massive riot that devastates the capital and marks the beginning of La Violencia, a decade-long civil conflict between the Liberal and Conservative parties that kills an estimated 200,000–300,000 people. The violence weakens state authority, particularly in rural Colombia, creating conditions that later allow armed groups and criminal organisations to flourish.

13th June, 1953 – General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seizes power in a military coup, promising to restore peace. Although he negotiates with some armed groups, many remain active in remote regions, leaving Colombia with weak government control outside major cities.

10th May, 1957 – Rojas Pinilla is overthrown after widespread protests. Colombia begins transitioning back to civilian rule, but the political divisions and armed self-defence groups created during La Violencia remain intact.

1st December, 1957 – Colombians approve the National Front agreement by referendum. Liberals and Conservatives agree to alternate the presidency and divide government positions equally for sixteen years. While this ends large-scale partisan violence, it excludes all other political movements, encouraging the formation of left-wing insurgencies.

27th May, 1964 – The Colombian Army attacks the rural community of Marquetalia during Operation Marquetalia, supported by U.S. anti-communist assistance. Surviving rebels regroup and eventually establish the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), which decades later finances itself largely through taxing and protecting the cocaine trade.

4th July, 1964 – The National Liberation Army (ELN) is founded, inspired by the Cuban Revolution. Like FARC, it becomes another armed insurgent group that later operates in regions important to drug trafficking.
's wider armed conflict.



17th January, 1965 – The ELN launches its first major armed attack on the town of Simacota, formally beginning its insurgency against the Colombian state.

30th May, 1973 – The United States establishes the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The agency begins coordinating international operations against narcotics trafficking, with Colombia soon becoming one of its highest priorities.

1975 – The Medellín Cartel begins taking shape under Pablo Escobar, Gustavo Gaviria, Carlos Lehder, José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha and the Ochoa family. Initially involved in smuggling and organised crime, they shift heavily into cocaine as demand in the United States explodes.

14th September, 1977 – Colombia and the United States sign the Extradition Treaty, allowing Colombian traffickers to be extradited to face trial in the US. This treaty later becomes the central issue driving Escobar's campaign of terror.

Late 1970s – The Cali Cartel, led by the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers and José Santacruz Londoño, expands rapidly. Unlike Medellín, Cali focuses on bribery, intelligence gathering and political influence instead of spectacular acts of violence, allowing it to grow with less public attention.

18th February, 1982 – Pablo Escobar is elected as an alternate member of Colombia's Chamber of Representatives. He uses politics and philanthropy to gain public support while secretly controlling one of the world's largest cocaine trafficking organisations.

August 1983 – Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla publicly exposes Escobar's criminal activities and forces his removal from Congress. Escobar views this as a personal humiliation and begins targeting the Colombian state directly.

30th April, 1984 – Medellín Cartel gunmen assassinate Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in Bogotá. The murder convinces President Belisario Betancur that negotiations with traffickers are impossible and marks the beginning of Colombia's open war against the Medellín Cartel.



3rd May, 1984 – The Colombian government begins actively enforcing extradition to the United States. Escobar realises that American prisons cannot be bribed, making extradition the greatest threat to his organisation.

Mid-1984 – Escobar and other traffickers establish Los Extraditables, whose sole objective is to abolish extradition. Their slogan, "We prefer a grave in Colombia to a prison in the United States," becomes the rallying cry for the cartel's campaign of bombings and assassinations.

17th November, 1984 – Carlos Lehder is indicted in the United States on major cocaine trafficking charges. The indictment signals that American authorities are now pursuing the cartel leadership itself rather than only intercepting drug shipments.

6th November, 1985 – The M-19 guerrilla movement storms Colombia's Palace of Justice, taking Supreme Court justices hostage. Some investigators have argued Escobar financed the attack because the court was handling extradition cases, although this remains disputed and has never been conclusively proven.

7th November, 1985 – The Colombian Army retakes the Palace of Justice after an intense battle that leaves more than 100 people dead, including eleven Supreme Court justices. The event becomes one of Colombia's greatest national tragedies and further weakens confidence in state institutions. 7th August, 1986 – Virgilio Barco becomes President of Colombia and adopts a much tougher anti-cartel strategy. His government increases military operations, strengthens cooperation with the DEA and expands efforts to dismantle the Medellín Cartel.

4th February, 1987 – Colombian authorities capture Medellín Cartel founder Carlos Lehder after years of investigation. His arrest demonstrates that even the cartel's highest-ranking leaders can be reached.

5th February, 1987 – Lehder is extradited to the United States only one day after his capture. His extradition terrifies Escobar and convinces him that preventing extradition must become his highest priority.



13th January, 1988 – The Medellín Cartel kidnaps Andrés Pastrana, then the mayor of Bogotá and a future President of Colombia. The kidnapping demonstrates that the cartel is willing to target prominent political figures to pressure the government.

25th January, 1988 – Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos is kidnapped and murdered after refusing cartel demands. His assassination intimidates prosecutors and highlights the cartel's growing influence over Colombia's justice system.

Throughout 1988 – The Cali Cartel quietly overtakes much of Medellín's international cocaine distribution network by relying on corruption, business investments and political infiltration rather than open warfare. At the same time, rivalry between the Cali and Medellín cartels intensifies.

1988 – FARC, ELN and several right-wing paramilitary groups increasingly finance themselves through the cocaine economy by taxing coca farmers, protecting laboratories or working with traffickers. The drug trade becomes deeply intertwined with Colombia's wider armed conflict.

15th January, 1989 – The Colombian government strengthens the Search Bloc, an elite National Police unit dedicated to hunting Pablo Escobar and dismantling the Medellín Cartel. The unit receives better equipment, training and intelligence support from the United States.

18th January, 1989 – Escobar begins paying rewards for every police officer killed. Hundreds of officers, particularly in Medellín, are murdered over the following months, making policing one of the most dangerous professions in Colombia.

18th February, 1989 – The Medellín Cartel assassinates Colonel Valdemar Franklin Quintero, one of Colombia's leading anti-drug police commanders. His death demonstrates the cartel's willingness to eliminate senior security officials.



30th May, 1989 – Colombia's Supreme Court reaffirms the legality of extradition, ensuring traffickers can continue to be sent to the United States. Escobar's hopes of defeating extradition through legal means effectively disappear.

18th August, 1989 – Presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán, Colombia's strongest advocate of extradition and anti-cartel reform, is assassinated during a campaign rally in Soacha. His murder convinces much of the country that the cartels have become a direct threat to Colombian democracy.

19th August, 1989 – President Barco declares a nationwide State of Siege, granting emergency powers to security forces. The government launches its most aggressive anti-cartel campaign to date.

24th August, 1989 – Colombia begins a massive offensive against the Medellín Cartel, confiscating hundreds of cartel properties, freezing assets, expanding extraditions and deploying thousands of police and soldiers. The United States increases intelligence sharing, surveillance assistance and DEA operations in support of the campaign.

2nd September, 1989 – The Medellín Cartel detonates a truck bomb outside the headquarters of El Espectador, Colombia's leading anti-cartel newspaper. The attack is intended to silence journalists who continue exposing cartel activities despite repeated threats.

October 1989 – Cooperation between Colombia and the United States reaches its highest level yet. American intelligence agencies provide surveillance technology, communications support and operational intelligence that significantly improves the Search Bloc's ability to locate cartel leaders.

November 1989 – Facing relentless pressure from Colombian security forces, expanding US involvement and increasing rivalry with the Cali Cartel, Escobar escalates his campaign of bombings, assassinations and attacks on civilian targets in an attempt to force the government to abolish extradition. By the end of November, Colombia is effectively experiencing a state of urban terrorism that will culminate in even deadlier attacks after this point.

ROLE OF ECTERNAL POWERS

United States

The United States was by far the most influential external power in the Colombian Narco War. It played a paradoxical role: on one hand, it was the world's largest consumer of cocaine, generating the enormous profits that allowed the Medellín and Cali Cartels to flourish. On the other hand, it became Colombia's strongest ally in combating the cartels through law enforcement cooperation, intelligence sharing, extradition agreements and financial assistance.

Cocaine Demand

During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, cocaine use increased dramatically in the United States. The drug became especially popular among affluent professionals before spreading more broadly across American society. This surge in demand transformed cocaine into a multi-billion-dollar industry. Colombian traffickers recognised that a kilogram of cocaine produced for only a few thousand dollars could sell in American cities for tens of thousands of dollars. The extraordinary profits enabled the Medellín and Cali Cartels to recruit thousands of gunmen, purchase aircraft and weapons, bribe politicians and police officers, and expand into one of the most powerful criminal enterprises in modern history. Although the United States did not intentionally create the Narco War, its domestic demand for cocaine provided the economic foundation that made the conflict possible.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), established in 1973, became the primary American agency responsible for combating international drug trafficking. The DEA maintained a significant presence in Colombia throughout the 1980s and worked closely with Colombian police and judicial authorities. Its responsibilities included gathering intelligence on trafficking organisations, monitoring cocaine shipments, identifying cartel leadership, training Colombian anti-narcotics units and coordinating international investigations. DEA intelligence contributed to several major operations against cartel leaders and helped Colombian authorities understand the increasingly complex structure of the Medellín and Cali Cartels.



Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Although the CIA's principal mission was intelligence rather than law enforcement, it supported Colombia by providing strategic intelligence relevant to cartel operations. The agency assisted in satellite surveillance, communications monitoring and the sharing of intelligence concerning trafficking routes and organised criminal networks. While the CIA was not directly involved in arrests, its intelligence often complemented DEA investigations and Colombian security operations.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became involved whenever cartel activities affected American territory or citizens. The FBI investigated money laundering, organised crime networks operating within the United States, acts of international terrorism linked to the cartels, and murders involving American citizens or officials. It also worked with federal prosecutors to build criminal cases against cartel leaders.

United States Department of State

The State Department treated narcotics trafficking as both a criminal and foreign policy issue. Throughout the 1980s, Washington consistently pressured Colombian governments to continue extraditing traffickers, strengthen anti-drug legislation, and cooperate with American agencies. Diplomatic support also encouraged Colombia to resist cartel intimidation despite increasing violence.

Extradition Policy

Perhaps the most significant American influence was the promotion of extradition. The 1977 U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty allowed suspected traffickers to stand trial in American courts. Unlike Colombian prisons, which were frequently affected by corruption and intimidation, American prisons were secure and beyond the influence of cartel leaders. For Pablo Escobar, extradition represented the greatest possible threat. He believed imprisonment in the United States would permanently destroy his control over the Medellín Cartel. Consequently, preventing extradition became the central objective of Los Extraditables, whose campaign of bombings, assassinations and kidnappings was designed to force Colombia into abolishing the treaty.

Intelligence, Equipment and Training

The United States supplied Colombia with extensive technical and operational assistance.

This included:

- specialised police training
- communications equipment
- surveillance technology
- intelligence sharing
- aircraft and logistical support
- funding for anti-narcotics operations

This assistance significantly strengthened Colombia's ability to pursue cartel leaders, particularly after President Virgilio Barco intensified anti-cartel operations in 1989.

Peru

During the 1980s, Peru was one of the world's largest producers of coca leaves, the plant from which cocaine is derived. Unlike Colombia, Peru specialised primarily in cultivating coca rather than refining it into finished cocaine. Peruvian farmers harvested coca leaves that were processed into coca paste before being transported across the border into Colombia. The Medellín and Cali Cartels relied heavily on these imports because Colombia itself did not initially produce sufficient coca to meet international demand. Large areas of Peru's coca-growing regions were difficult for the government to control due to mountainous terrain and the presence of insurgent groups such as the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). This instability allowed traffickers to purchase coca paste with relatively little interference. Without Peruvian coca production, Colombian laboratories could not have manufactured cocaine on the scale that they did during the 1980s.

Bolivia

Bolivia was another major supplier of coca leaves and coca paste during the rise of the Colombian cartels. Like Peru, Bolivia exported coca paste to Colombian laboratories, where it was chemically refined into cocaine before being smuggled abroad. Weak state control in some rural regions and widespread corruption enabled traffickers to operate effectively within the coca-producing areas. The Medellín and Cali Cartels maintained extensive commercial relationships with Bolivian suppliers, making Bolivia

a critical component of the international cocaine supply chain.

Panama

During the 1980s, Panama became one of the most important financial centres for Colombian traffickers. Under General Manuel Noriega, Panama possessed a sophisticated international banking system that attracted enormous quantities of foreign money.

Drug traffickers exploited this financial infrastructure to:

- launder cocaine profits
- hide assets
- create shell companies
- transfer money internationally
- finance future trafficking operations

Panama also served as a logistical transit point for both drugs and cash moving between South America, North America and Europe. Although Noriega publicly cooperated with anti-drug efforts at times, he was later accused by the United States of collaborating with traffickers and facilitating aspects of the cocaine trade. By late 1989, tensions between Noriega and the United States had escalated significantly, culminating in the American invasion of Panama in December 1989.

Caribbean Nations and the Bahamas

Before improved surveillance reduced Caribbean trafficking routes, many cocaine shipments passed through the Caribbean on their way to the United States. The Bahamas became particularly important because Medellín Cartel leader Carlos Lehder established operations on Norman's Cay, a small island that served as a refuelling and distribution centre for aircraft carrying cocaine into Florida.

From Norman's Cay:

- aircraft departed Colombia
- refuelled in the Bahamas
- continued into southern Florida

The Caribbean's numerous islands, long coastlines and limited law enforcement capacity made it an ideal smuggling corridor. These routes enabled the Medellín Cartel to move enormous quantities of cocaine into the United States throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Cuba

Cuba's influence on the Narco War was indirect rather than operational. The success of the Cuban Revolution (1959) inspired revolutionary movements across Latin America.

Groups such as:

- FARC
- ELN
- M-19

were influenced by Marxist and socialist revolutionary ideas that spread after Fidel Castro came to power. Although Cuba itself was not involved in the Medellín or Cali Cartels, these guerrilla organisations later became intertwined with Colombia's cocaine economy.

By the 1980s, many guerrilla groups financed their insurgencies by:

- taxing coca farmers
- protecting laboratories
- charging traffickers for operating within territories under guerrilla control

This blurred the distinction between ideological insurgency and organised crime, further complicating Colombia's internal conflict.

International Financial System

The cocaine trade generated billions of dollars in cash that could not simply be deposited into Colombian banks. To disguise the illegal origins of these profits, traffickers relied upon the international financial system.

Money laundering involved:

- offshore banking centres
- shell corporations
- false import-export businesses
- foreign real estate investments
- complex international financial transfers

These methods allowed cartel wealth to appear legitimate while financing continued trafficking operations. Without access to international financial networks, the cartels would have struggled to manage their enormous profits.

International Arms Markets

The Medellín and Cali Cartels required military-grade weapons to wage war against the Colombian government. Rather than manufacturing these weapons themselves, they purchased them through international black markets.

Weapons acquired included:

- AK-47 assault rifles
- M16 rifles
- submachine guns
- grenades
- explosives
- ammunition
- military communications equipment

These arms equipped cartel gunmen (sicarios) and enabled increasingly sophisticated attacks on police stations, judges, politicians and government buildings. The availability of international arms markets transformed the cartels from criminal organisations into heavily armed paramilitary forces capable of confronting the Colombian state.

Relevant laws, acts, agreements:

Constitution Of Columbia:

The Supreme Law Of Columbia:

Article 16 → Obligates the State to protect life, property, and maintain public order, forming the constitutional basis for anti-cartel operations.

Article 120 → Defines the President's executive powers, including command of the Armed Forces, maintenance of public order, appointment of officials, and execution of laws.

Article 121 → Authorizes the President to declare a State of Siege during serious threats to public order, permitting emergency decrees and expanded security powers.

Article 55 → Empowers the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of laws and government actions, including matters relating to extradition.

Article 76 → Vests legislative authority in Congress, including the approval of treaties and enactment of national legislation.

Article 61 → Judicial independence Reinforces that courts should remain independent despite executive pressure.


Article 63 → Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Público) Defines the role of the

Attorney General/Public Ministry in protecting legality and prosecuting offences.

Articles 164–170 (Title on Armed Forces) → Armed Forces Establishes that the military exists to defend the nation and preserve constitutional order and remains under civilian command.

INTERNATIONAL LAWS:

- United Nations Charter (1945) → Establishes the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and international cooperation, governing how states may respond to transnational threats.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) → Sets out the fundamental human rights and freedoms that all individuals are entitled to, serving as the foundation of modern human rights law.
- Geneva Conventions (1949) → Define the rules of humanitarian law protecting civilians, wounded combatants, prisoners of war, and medical personnel during armed conflicts.
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) → Establishes the rights of refugees and the obligations of states to protect persons fleeing persecution.
- 1951 Refugee Protocol (1967) → Removes the geographical and temporal limitations of the 1951 Refugee Convention, extending refugee protections globally.
- Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1953) → Creates the international framework for controlling narcotic drugs and combating illicit drug production and trafficking.
- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) → Establishes the rules governing diplomatic relations, privileges, immunities, and the protection of diplomatic missions.
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) → Legally guarantees fundamental civil and political rights, including due process, fair trial, liberty, and freedom from arbitrary detention.
- American Convention on Human Rights (1969) → Guarantees human rights and judicial protections for member states of the Organization of American States.
- Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) → Extends international drug control measures to synthetic psychotropic substances such as LSD and amphetamines.

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- Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (1977) → Regulates humanitarian protections during non-international armed conflicts, making it particularly relevant to Colombia's conflict with insurgent groups.
 - Colombia→United States Extradition Treaty (1977) → Allows individuals accused of serious crimes to be extradited between Colombia and the United States for criminal Prosecution.
 - United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) → Strengthens international cooperation against drug trafficking through extradition, asset seizure, intelligence sharing, money laundering controls, and mutual legal assistance.
 - Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS Charter) (1948) → Establishes the Organization of American States and promotes regional cooperation in democracy, security, justice, and peaceful dispute resolution.
 - Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) (1947) → Provides a framework for collective defense and mutual assistance among states in the Americas against external threats.
 - Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) (1944) → Establishes the legal framework governing international civil aviation, including airspace sovereignty and aviation safety.
 - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) → Defines the legal rights and responsibilities of states over maritime zones, navigation, and law enforcement at sea (many provisions reflected customary international law by 1989).



Introduction to Crisis Elements:

Directives

Directives are the most powerful instruments available to a delegate in a crisis committee. Through them, a delegate can discreetly exercise portfolio powers to influence almost any aspect of the agenda. They enable real-time actions, provided the delegate presents a plausible motive (the reason for the action) and a realistic method of execution (how the goal will be achieved) within the boundaries of their portfolio authority.


Directives are the strongest tool available to any delegate in a crisis setting. They allow you to discreetly exercise your portfolio powers and intervene in almost any sector of the agenda. Directives are designed for real-time action, but to be effective they must demonstrate both a plausible motive (why the action is necessary) and a workable execution plan (how the action can realistically succeed) within the scope of your assigned powers.

For instance, if you were the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, you could authorize the deployment of the Royal Navy to a contested maritime zone, call for an emergency session of the Commonwealth, or dispatch MI6 operatives abroad. What you could not do, however, is suddenly seize ownership of the Reserve Bank of India, since that falls completely outside your authority. Similarly, although you technically could ban all wheat exports from the UK, there would be no logical reason to do so unless it was in response to a grain blight or a famine-related crisis update.

Directives ultimately determine the trajectory of the committee and play a decisive role in whether it succeeds or falters. To help delegates craft strong directives, it is important to understand their types and how they function.

There are two primary categories: covert and overt.

A covert directive is an individual action carried out strictly under your portfolio powers. Only the Executive Board will read it, and they will decide whether to approve or reject parts or the whole based on feasibility. They also control whether the directive appears in the crisis update and what outcome it generates.



An overt directive, in contrast, involves collaboration among multiple delegates to pursue a coordinated strategy. These are shown to the entire committee, debated, and then voted upon. If passed by a simple majority, they may be forwarded to the Executive Board. While majority support does not automatically guarantee success, it demonstrates broad backing, which increases the chance of implementation.

Once submitted, directives are reviewed by the Executive Board, which assesses their practicality and determines how they shape subsequent updates. Regardless of whether they are overt or covert, a strong directive should always answer six guiding questions: Who, What, Why, Where, When, and How.

Directives will only be accepted during official communication periods, unless the Executive Board specifically makes an exception.

Broadly, directives can be classified into:

- Covert operations (Covert Directive)
- Joint operations (Joint Directive)
- Portfolio Requests
- Agreements (Treaties, MOUs, Accords, etc.)
- Presidential or Executive Statements
- Overt directives

Most of these categories are self-explanatory, but Portfolio Requests deserve special clarification.

A portfolio request is submitted when a delegate requires specific, actionable information necessary for their next step. In essence, this is a formal way of tasking government agencies or instruments under your control to gather intelligence or conduct a preliminary action so you can plan further. These qualify as covert directives, but they must be practical and relevant. The Executive Board will not accept random or baseless requests for information that cannot reasonably be delivered.

Finally, operations themselves generally fall into two overarching types: intelligence operations and military/strategic operations. A clear understanding of the ground situation is essential in deciding which type of action is most appropriate at any given moment.

Format for directives

Type: Covert / Overt

Operation Name: Official codename or designation of the operation.

To: The Executive Board

From: (Your Portfolio/Designation)

Signatories: (Other Delegates formally supporting, authorizing, or participating in the operation.)

Primary Objective: The immediate operational goal the directive seeks to achieve.

Secondary Objective: The broader strategic outcome intended beyond the immediate operation.

Plan of Action: Present the operation in sequential points detailing each phase from initiation to completion. Each point should clearly explain methods, logistics, coordination, execution mechanisms, communication procedures, risk mitigation, and contingency responses. Directives that fail to explain operational feasibility may be rejected or partially implemented.

Personnel / Resources Involved: Identify all personnel, agencies, military units, intelligence assets, funding sources, equipment, logistical support, and external actors involved in the operation.

Operation Date(s): State when the operation will begin, either by specific date and time (military format, e.g., 1200 hours for 12:00 PM) or by timeline markers such as D-1, D-5, etc. If the operation has a definite duration, include the projected end time as well. (Dates are optional since crisis updates may alter timelines rapidly.)

Signed: If the directive is private, sign with your portfolio name only. For joint directives, include the portfolio names of all involved delegates.

Important Note for Delegates:

While committee updates will primarily be shaped by the directives you submit, it is essential to understand that not every directive will automatically translate into an update visible to the committee. The Executive Board retains discretion over which directives are implemented, partially implemented, or withheld, depending on feasibility and relevance.

Approval of directives does not guarantee operational success. Outcomes will depend on realism, available resources, opposing actions, and evolving committee developments.



Uncertainty in Crisis

In a crisis setting, it is not possible to know the outcome of every action immediately. The success or failure of directives depends on numerous factors, most notably timing, execution, and the period required for actions to unfold. Delegates should therefore not expect constant or instant feedback on the status of every directive they submit during committee.

There will be situations where a directive is approved but does not appear as an update, often due to logistical or practical considerations. Conversely, there may be instances where directives that do not succeed still appear in updates, as a way of showing delegates the potential consequences of their attempted actions.


The Executive Board emphasizes that delegates keep these dynamics in mind. Understanding the unpredictability of crisis outcomes will ensure smoother and more effective functioning of the committee as a whole.

For any clarifications, please do not hesitate to reach out to members of the Executive Board.

Communiqués

A communiqué is a formal tool that allows delegates to communicate with a portfolio that is not physically represented in the committee, in order to seek its cooperation, resources, or support. It is written in the style of a letter, with a simple From and To format. A communiqué can either be attached to a directive when outside assistance is needed to execute it or exist as a standalone document that may influence future actions. All communiqués are considered covert, meaning their contents remain confidential.

Communiqués may be submitted individually or jointly. Once the Executive Board receives a communiqué, they assume the role of the addressed portfolio and evaluate the request from that perspective. If the proposal is well-framed, reasonable, and offers clear benefit or incentive to the recipient, the communiqué will be accepted.



If the request is poorly constructed or offers no real value, the communiqué will be rejected. In cases where it passes, the Executive Board will notify the delegate of the resources or support secured, either privately or through partial/full reflection in a subsequent crisis update.

Press Releases.

A press release is a tool used to communicate information to the entire committee. It serves as a way to announce significant developments such as foreign policy shifts, major agreements, trade deals, treaties, or even outcomes of covert directives that a delegate or bloc wishes to bring into the public sphere for strategic influence.

At times, understandings reached during informal debate may be formalized through a press release, allowing blocs to present them for wider discussion in formal debate. While direct questioning on a press release is not permitted (unless the Executive Board explicitly allows it), the content of the release can always be analyzed, critiqued, or challenged by other delegates during their speeches.

All press releases must be submitted to the Executive Board, who will then decide whether to read it aloud themselves or allow the delegate to announce it before the committee. Unlike directives, press releases must be written in a continuous, narrative format, since they are read out word-for-word in

Sample Directive

OPERATION MAOFUNCTION

To: The Executive Board, General Liu Yuzhang, Commander of the 5th Air Force Group, ROC Air Command

From: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China

Date Issued: 26 June 1946

OBJECTIVE: To Execute a pre-emptive bombing campaign targeting the Zhengzhou Railway Junction which will aim to disable the PLA's primary logistics hub, sever vital rail links to Kaifeng, Luoyang, and nearby Red-controlled regions as well as cripple CCP troop movement into Manchuria and the western corridor, and inflict severe psychological and logistical

disruption upon CCP command infrastructure.

PLAN OF ACTION

Zhengzhou Railway Junction serves as the central intersection point connecting east-west and north-south CCP logistics across Henan Province. Intelligence reports confirm its use for mass troop transfers, fuel storage, and supply convoys bound for Manchuria and Shaanxi. The use of aircraft from the R.O.C Air Command & Military Assets are as follows:

Air Fleet Deployments

- 4 x A-26 Invader Bombers from the 5th Bomber Squadron, these will serve as the primary strike aircraft targeting the yard, fuel & tracks
- 2 x B-25 Mitchell from the Tactical Wing of the ROCAF, their target will be the Barracks & armoured train hangers.
- 3 x P-51 Mustang from the 7th Fighter Wing which will serve as close air support, anti-air suppression and rail strafing.
- 1 x C-47 Skytrain from the 1st Psychological Ops Unit which will conduct Leaflet airdrops & serve as a decoy pass.
- A Recon Balloon Crew which will serve as the 1st Observation team, their job will be to hold a fixed position near the Luoshan Hills for pre-strike tracking and enemy movement logging.

The Weapon Loadout

- 32 x MK82 500 lb General-Purpose Bombs
- M47 Incendiary Clusters
- White Phosphorus Canisters (for fuel depot ignition)
- M71 Fragmentation Bombs (anti-personnel, anti-engineer crew)
- Strafing cannons mounted on P-51s (Hispano-Suiza 20mm)

Reconnaissance Systems

- Aerial F-24 Recon Cameras
- Panoramic wide-field camera on the tethered observation balloon
- Photogrammetry assets for the terrain impact analysis

STRATEGIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS:

The operation at 0400 hours, 29 June 1946, from Xiangyang Forward Base under total radio silence, the duration will approximately be 1 hour from take-off to exit from combat zone. The flight corridor that will be used is from Luohe - Xuchang - Zhengzhou. Xiangyang Forward Airbase, located in Hubei Province will serve as the primary airbase where the aircraft will take off from for the operation, their exfiltration route will be via the Pingdingshan corridor which after they will enter R.O.C controlled Wuhan airspace. All units which are directly involved will carry forged civilian weather reconnaissance credentials in case of capture.

PRIMARY TARGETS:

(a) ZHENGZHOU RAILWAY SWITCHYARD COMPLEX (GRID: 34.75°N,

113.65°E): Aircraft will focus on destroying all major switching tracks from Zones A–G, collapse the central signal control and repeater tower as well as destroying the eastern locomotive turntable and repair bay. A-26s will drop 8 × 500 lb general-purpose bombs each (GP MK82), which are fused for shallow ground penetration and fragmentation over the track surfaces.

(b) SECONDARY TARGET - FUEL STORAGE DEPOT (West of station)

The Depot holds approximately 80,000 gallons of diesel in 2 main tanks which will be targeted by 2 × B-25s which will release an incendiary + HE payload. The direct result of this will be igniting a long-duration fire which is visible from the surrounding 50 km causing psychological disruption.

(c) KAIFENG; LUOYANG RAIL CORRIDORS

A-26s will drop 4x 250 lb bombs in staggered formation to crater the Yellow River rail bridge east of the city. P-51s will be directed to mine the Luoyang corridor rail spurs and destroy the nearby signal tower. This will delay PLA repairs by at least 10 days.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN (“MAO’S TOILET PAPER”):

At 0445 hrs, the C-47 will conduct a wide-area leaflet drop over Kaifeng, Zhengzhou, and Luoyang at approximately 6,000 ft. 25,000 propaganda flyers printed in simplified Mandarin and Hainanese dialect will be distributed. The leaflets will read messages such as “The Red Rails Burn. Return to the Republic.” “Your Commanders Have Abandoned You; The Nation Awaits.” As well as including forged CCP withdrawal orders and instructions to surrender. The Leaflets will use old R.O.C seals and Party signatures to legitimize the visual design. RECONNAISSANCE AND AFTER-

ACTION EVALUATION: Aerial recon via Kodak F-24 cameras will begin at 0430 hrs taking high-resolution imaging of impact sites. The Observation balloon stationed at Luoshan Hills to record pre-strike and post-strike train movements. The required output of the reconnaissance will be 10+ classified images of switchyard and fuel depot and 2 full panorama sets of Zhengzhou and the surrounding corridor. All of these must be delivered to Nanjing HQ by 30 June 1800 hrs, the sanitized images are to be declassified and sent to international correspondents within 72 hours.

SABOTAGE OPERATIONS USING (JUNTONG - UNIT “BLACK TORCH”):

The agents will be disguised as a refugee convoy from Zhoukou under night cover. Their objective will be to destroy PLA recovery equipment caches, interrogate/eliminate repair crew officers, leave behind forged “Red traitor” notes to provoke CCP purges.

The Backup plan includes planting PLA-looking uniforms on Black Torch agents to create internal CCP confusion if discovered.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY:

All aircraft will fly under a civilian meteorological research mission as a cover; all communication will be limited to burst encrypted shortwave during entire operation and the pilots instructed to self-destruct targeting maps if any aircraft crash imminent.

EXPECTED OUTCOME:

The strike will cripple CCP logistics for 10-14 days, drawing the attention of the PLA away from the Siping and diminishing their northern and western defences. It will cause a slowdown in troop mobilization, scatter reinforcements, and provide a strategic window for R.O.C offensives from Mukden and Anyang and towards Yanan, supported by newly supplied U.S. equipment.

Sample Communique

From: Van Tien Dung, Chief of General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam

To: Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander in Chief, People's Army of Vietnam
Respected General,

Though our invasion through the Viet Cong was successfully initiated, a colonial revolt from the US has held us back, unable to seize Quang Tri. Civilians continue to evacuate through the Mu Gia pass, and Guerrilla training is halted and postponed.

As my Commander in Chief, I urge you once again, to fully resort to an invasion from the PAVN without smaller, poorly coordinated infantry attacks:

Prepare for the mobilisation of ten light infantry divisions (19800), twenty ranger battalions (81st Group), four armoured cavalry groups (2200), along with airborne 32nd and 85th battalion regiments. Deploy VPAF (Air Force) Mig-17 fighter jets from bases in Shenzhen and Hainan Island (est. 1963), through a press release to the CCP Ministry of Defense, via any Secretary member to the VPA Sub Bureau of Intelligence. An already built tunnel network from the PAVN embassy in Phuoc Long to Saigon (20.25) miles constituting the "Iron Triangle" in the Cu Chi District (est. 1965) will house the regiments and divisions for however long they need to be sustained, with ample food, water, and

fundamental essentials. Time the arrival of airborne fleets, such that they fly through Laos, directly Southbound to the Mekong Delta, after which a rendezvous operation should be in order. En route to Saigon, conduct raids on the Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut minor US bases to damage artillery reserves, using the II-28 twin engine bombers at the PAVN's disposal. Time the arrival of airborne fleets, such that they fly through Laos, directly Southbound to the Mekong Delta, after which a rendezvous operation should be in order. En route to Saigon, conduct raids on the Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut minor US bases to damage artillery reserves, using the II-28 twin engine bombers at the PAVN's disposal. 3 hours afterwards, launch a skirmish across guarded Saigon outskirts, near Xuan Loc. The strength of the US Army doesn't match the quantity of PAVN troops at this juncture. Civilian casualties are substantially unlikely, as the PAVN is a trained military, unlike the Viet Cong. The invasion will continue directly until we lay siege to Saigon.

In all truth and sincerity,
Van Tien Duang

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