

Sharanya Narayani International School Model United Nations 2022

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



Agenda: Combating the Transnational Trafficking of Illicit Firearms

Chairperson: Mihir Dasgupta

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Dear Delegates,

We're absolutely elated to welcome you all to the third edition of the Sharanya Narayani International School Model United Nations! We hope that this conference as a whole will push you to your limits, refine your inner diplomat, upgrade your critical thinking, writing, and creative abilities, expand your awareness of issues that plague the modern world, and perhaps even provide you with a foundation to build on during your time on Model UN circuits. Last, but not least, we want you to enjoy your time at SNISMUN 2022.

The agenda at hand, "Combating the Transnational Trafficking of Illicit Firearms" revolves around the regulation and legislation in small arms trades across the globe and more importantly, their implementation. The combination of three foundational pieces of legislation, as will be discussed in this guide, are integral to setting up a regulatory environment in which to present your solutions. We expect delegates to understand this environment, debate its merits and faults, and ultimately, work within its frameworks to suggest globally viable policies to improve the management of illicit arms trades.

An additional difficulty presented by this agenda is its depth. We strongly suggest that delegates base their research on two basic aspects: firearm legislation, and the current status of the policies based on said legislation. An overview of these facets are detailed in the length of this guide, in order to adequately discuss all aspects of the issue. We have over 10 hours of committee deliberation time: a solution to the problem cannot be reached in the first 3, especially in light of the UNODC's unique role in the discussion of organized crime.

Regarding delegate conduct, a rather counterintuitive suggestion the executive board would like to make to all the delegates is to compete to win. That is not to say that being the most ruthless, loudest person in the room is what we hope to see out of all of you. We're asking you to aspire. Aspire to be the best delegate you possibly can be, and regardless of whether you are offered that placement, you'll walk away from this conference a stronger delegate for it. Participating for the sake of participation does no one any favours. Put in your honest best effort, and this conference will have been worth it. If you come into committee with your own goal, which could range from being more assertive in unmoderated caucuses to being more precise in your documentation, and you achieve it - you've made use of your conference.

From tense and taut discussions, chaotic arguments over documentation, to possibly even more chaotic unmods, you'll certainly have your hands full. However, balancing this exhilaration against appropriate delegate conduct is a line all delegates are expected to toe, to ensure fruitful debate for all. How well you work with your fellow delegates, understand your position,

articulate it, and carry yourself in committee is arguably going to determine your degree of performance, and therefore, your placement.

As always, delegates are more than welcome to reach out to us with any concerns or questions they may have. Our emails are listed below. To the circuit veterans and first-timers alike, we're extremely excited to have you in our committee!

*Regards,
Mihir Dasgupta*

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Note: Delegates are required to submit position papers in order to be considered for placements (see pg 18)

Committee Overview

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides a unique role in the international community's response to criminal justice, terrorism, corruption, drug usage, and organized crime. The ODC consists of a delocalized set of sub-committees that individually convene every two years to establish priorities for worldwide criminal policies and create transnational law on the same. It serves as a catalyst for intergovernmental action, provides leadership, and aids in the achievement of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through its ministerial declarations and resolutions.

Although the UNODC resolutions might not be legally enforceable, they represent the current state of the global community's understanding of pressing concerns to crime prevention and control, foster consensus, and serve as an essential starting point for action on all things to do with crime across the world.

Governance and Structure

The ODC is led by an Executive Director. The UN Division for Operations assists its Director in the general conduct of business of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The Bureau is composed of 4 regional offices, in addition to a variety of field offices to diversify and spread the impact of the UNODC's work.

The ODC segregates its personnel through a series of divisions that tackle one aspect of the management of a UN committee. These include the Division for Operations, Division for Treaty Affairs, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, and the Division for Management. The ODC is also divided by topical areas, into commissions/conferences pertaining to various concerns of interest to the committee - the CCPCJ, CND, UNTOC/COP, and COSP for example.

Mandate, Functions, and Powers

UNODC was formulated in 1997, in Cairo, as the result of a merger between the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention. It largely seeks to help Member States by helping them develop their capacity to internally implement the rule of law. However, it also looks to define certain standards for these implementations, building towards global consensus on the control of drugs, organized crime, corruption, et cetera.

The functioning of the UNODC is tethered to a series of conventions formed across its lifetime. Notable examples include the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), its subsidiary protocols, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and the 3 international drug control conventions: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

The UNODC has set up a global network of field offices that collectively support governments in the implementation of policies in line with their ratification of the various conventions that underline the committee's proceedings. They aim to do this in an integrative manner that spans the committee's broad topical focus and consequent understanding of the mechanisms required to put these policies in place. Some specific support that the UNODC provides to governments is evidence-based research, the development of legal and technical tools, legislative assistance, capacity building and international law enforcement and judicial cooperation for enhanced investigation and prosecution of crimes relating to illicit manufacture and trafficking of firearms.

Definition of Key Terms:

1. Armed Violence: *The use or threatened use of weapons to inflict death, injury or psychosocial harm (OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)*
2. Firearm: *Any portable barreled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. (Firearm Protocol, 2001)*
 - a. *Antique firearms and replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law.*
 - b. *In no case shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899;*
3. Organized Criminal Group: *A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UNTOC, 2004)*
4. Illicit Manufacturing: *The manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and components or ammunition: (Firearm Protocol)*
 - i. *From parts and components illicitly trafficked;*
 - ii. *Without a license or authorization from a competent authority of the State Party where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or*

iii. Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture, in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol;

Agenda

Agenda: Combating the transnational trafficking of illicit firearms

The Problem of Illicit Firearm/SALW Trafficking

Worldwide, firearms pose a grave threat to communities, simply through their magnifying impact of an individual. The impact that any individual can be dangerously empowered with when armed with a firearm is immense, with the power to inflict significant harm that ripples across all aspects of society.

The executive board would look favourably upon a broad range of discussion, perhaps touching upon the direct and indirect impact of firearms, the international and national responses and approaches to addressing the problem, the distinctions between the licit and illicit firearm markets, et cetera.

Direct Impacts of the Illicit SALW Trade

Inadequate control against firearm trafficking has a rather obvious impact on a population: gun violence. This is particularly important in the illicit market given that new gun owners are not verified against security/terrorist watchlists and are more likely to have connections to organized crime, therefore being more likely to be perpetrators of gun violence. The ripple effects of gun violence demand mention as well, destroying communities' confidence in convening, leaving traumatic psychological scars on individuals, et cetera. A 2013 UNODC study on homicide found that an average of 41% of homicides' weapon of choice is a variation on small arms, a number which significantly increases in conflict zones. They also tend to macroscopically add to the discord sowed by a deterioration in individual mental health, leaving a region more susceptible to violence at large.

The economic costs of gun violence are also noteworthy. At the macro-level, there are financial costs to the State, such as health and social care costs, the costs to the criminal justice and penal systems, and the economic impact of lost productivity. Furthermore, the perception that a country or region is unsafe because of armed violence also has a significant impact on investments, tourism and other business sectors. Tunisia's decline in economic growth and their position on the BEE list in 2015 in the aftermath of a terrorist attack that killed 38 people is a

key example of this.

The context of a nation's government also plays a key role in the type of damage gun violence can inflict upon it. Non-conflict zones tend to measure these impacts in terms of failures of security, particularly through crime rates, like homicide. Conversely, in armed conflict situations, the presence of small arm weapons tend to invite a slew of increasingly military-grade weapons that up the stakes of any direct conflict and offer an involved party an edge over the other. The consequent costs to communities, development, and individuals increases in tandem. The emboldenment of improved military armaments also usually means that parties are less likely to approach a centre to negotiate a ceasefire. Armed robberies, domestic violence, hijacking and kidnappings, terrorism, slavery, trafficking of humans and goods, endangered species poaching, stealing of livestock - all tend to increase as more firearms become available in conflict areas.

Indirect Impacts of the Illicit SALW Trade

The weaponization of society undermines development at large, disincentivizing investment, increasing government costs, and redirecting the power of social capital towards warfare. These are usually consequences of direct impacts of gun violence.

Its relationship with human rights is more complicated: while firearms play a critical role in law enforcement and military operations for the protection of human rights and security, they are also often used to violate human rights. This applies to firearm usage at large, but the contradiction is less polarized when discussing illicit firearms. However, the presence of a legal market's often enables the development of an underground market.

The difference in how gun violence affects men and women also provides a source of societal conflict. Men are disproportionately more likely to be victims of gun violence at large, often in a ratio of 3:1, although this varies across geographies. However, women are disproportionately affected by intimate partner/family-related homicide than men: two thirds of victims globally are female. Consequently, the presence of firearms at home may increase the risk that domestic violence escalates into homicide, or that firearms are used to commit suicide. Homicide also disproportionately affects youth, with the UNODC Homicide study finding that over half of homicide victims being under the age of 30.

The impacts on healthcare workers and the industry are also notable. Gun violence necessitates not only increased healthcare, but critical care responses - the training to which is often underprovided in developing nations, leaving higher mortality rates to gun violence. The overall

threat to the collapse of such healthcare industries are also higher in such regions. The emotional impact on healthcare workers is often referred to as “secondary trauma”, due to insufficient resources, lack of training, supplies and medicines, heightened anxiety, bureaucratic hurdles, stress and exhaustion. Variations of this effect was seen worldwide across the COVID-19 pandemic. This can be higher in populations where gun violence is rare, leaving hospital workers untrained medically, technically and emotionally.

The Link Between Firearms, Terrorism, and Organized Crime

Firearms represent and provide power to crime groups, in addition to actually facilitating it. Additionally, they are a valuable commodity in these rings, to be traded for other illicit goods, such as drugs, precious metals or looted or trafficked cultural heritage. Purchasers of these firearms are frequently involved in, and connected to, a wide range of illicit networks of all kinds (drugs, extortion, human trafficking, etc.). Instances of this direct conflict are prominent in Central America, according the UNODC Homicide report. An important point of discussion remains in identifying the differences between firearms supplying terrorist and organized crime activity, and whether any differences in legislation or policy should be accounted for.

Private Militarization as a Result of Illicit Firearms

This is primarily proven by the development of private security companies that aim to protect individual interests, driven by a general insecurity in safety due to organized crime/terrorism.

Depending on national legislation pertaining to the freedom with which these industries operate, they source firearms from either the licit or illicit market. These companies remains under-regulated in many countries across the world, and the validity of such regulation is debated in light of the presence of organized crime. A consequence of the laxity in the civilian private security industry also provides a pipeline for under-regulated arms to fall in illicit hands.

Although there are no global instruments on this regulation, common recommendations include identifying specific areas under which open-carry licenses be produced, and clearly defining the limits to its government oversight. A secondary risk that these industries pose is the possible development of shell corporations that masquerade as private security acting on behalf of organized crime groups, allowing these groups to operate with significantly reduced oversight, strengthening their expansion.

However, the *'Introductory Handbook on State Regulation concerning Civilian Private Security Services and their Contribution to Crime Prevention and Community Safety'* (UNODC, 2014a)

found that that civilian private security services can provide States with a resource, which if properly regulated can contribute significantly to reducing crime and enhancing community safety, in particular through partnerships and information-sharing with the State police.

International Legal Framework

The international legal framework in response to firearms is based on 3 central goals: crime control, disarmament, and trade regulation, each of which have led to the development of various global instruments to combat the issue:

- Crime Control: UNTOC (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) and the Firearms Protocol.
- Disarmament: United Nations Programme of Action (PoA)
- Trade Regulation: Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

These are collectively supplemented by the International Tracing Instrument (ITI).

The Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC), its supplementary Firearms Protocol (FP), and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) are multilateral treaties adopted by the UNGA. They contain legally binding and mostly mandatory provisions. States accede to these instruments through an accession process of ratification, acceptance or approval, following which the States become party to the instruments and commit to comply with the legal obligations under them.

Conversely, the PoA and ITI are not legally binding treaties and have no accession process. They require *political commitment*. The PoA is, as the name suggests, a programme setting out measures that States aspire towards. Similarly, the ITI is essentially, a standard-setting tool to facilitate tracing processes. Developed at different times and varied thematic contexts, and with different scope, each of these instruments have in common partially overlapping and compatible objectives and purposes.

The underlying common approach followed by more or less all of these instruments is that of regulating and controlling legal firearms throughout their lifecycle, with a view to prevent their illicit diversion and trafficking. By providing a clear framework for the legal activities surrounding firearms, it is hoped to better define and detect the activities and actions that divert from the established legal regime to become illicit and thus needing to be combated.

All of these instruments are dependent on national intervention, through 3 major methods. First are preventive and security measures that enable the control and tracing of firearms at any

time. Second are effective criminal justice responses to enforce the regulatory framework through adequate criminalization provisions, seizure, confiscation and destruction of illicit firearms. Third is effective international cooperation and information exchange for the purposes of investigation and prosecution.

There are also a variety of regional treaties that have been enacted in the Americas, Africa, and Europe, which often provide stronger obligations than these global instruments. Delegates are expected to take note of any such treaties their countries have ratified, to form a cohesive picture of their pre-existing legal obligations to firearm control.

Delegates are strongly encouraged to base their study of the international legal framework in regulating firearms on two dimensions:

- a) The roles of individual instruments, and how each contributes to the collective effort of regulation. A delegate country's ratification stance is incredibly important here.
- b) The three intervention methods, in terms of specific policies for each and the merits and success of these policies in their country.

Understanding these dimensions will allow delegates to form targeted responses and policy suggestions in solution-based discussions. Additionally, it will allow delegates to identify legal loopholes that plague the current situation of firearm regulation. We hope to see responses of this sort in committee, empowered by effective research.

The Limited Scope of International Legal Instruments

The central issue with adopting international frameworks to gun control is the oft-argued conflict with national interests and sovereignty. Because the actual implementation of such legal instruments is voluntary, countries that are often worst-affected by illicit firearms fail to carry out measures to combat guns. Additionally, powerful lobbyists in certain countries may provide political obstacles to such ratification.

Essentially, the legal obligations that are set out in these instruments largely speak of intent: an intent to legislate, an intent to regulate, an intent to monitor, et cetera. However, because they remain treaties, they cannot prescribe specific policies with technical detail bindingly, although they may suggest them - as in the UNODC Model Law, 2014. A consequence of this is that countries lacking the political, financial, or infrastructural ability to implement these instruments in their truest spirit simply fail to do so. Moreover, several other important areas remain insufficiently addressed (by being outside the scope or purpose of the respective instrument) and widely left to national implementation, such as civilian ownership.

This is particularly difficult in conflict areas, where firearms, even illicit ones, provide a source of income to citizens. The civic response to measures that these instruments suggest could create public backlash, preventing their implementation arguably in the regions that require it the most.

This central issue leads to the development of a variety of spinoff problems:

- Comparative study and evidence gathering exercises remain difficult if certain countries lack monitoring infrastructure.
- National disparities in effective monitoring can hamper transnational intelligence pooling
- Legal status of specific firearm types vary in different countries, and may therefore evade detection once marked legal.
- Variations in national perspectives to criminal justice mean that prosecution is not uniform, and may attract concentrations of SALW accumulation in specific regions/nations.
- Crimes as a result are often outside the jurisdiction of international law, and therefore, justice. Therefore, perpetrators may be held to different degrees of punishment in different States.

The above list is far from exhaustive, and delegates are encouraged to research other areas of conflicts of interest, and moreover, conceptualize solutions to them. These solutions, as is true of all solutions presented in the UNODC, are encouraged to be specific: here, for example, to types of firearm offences (use, possession, manufacturing, trafficking, etc.). Although the Firearm Protocol defines these offences, they only pertain to cases that are both transnational and tied to organized crime, and therefore, may not be applied to domestic law.

Case Studies

MAP 1 ---- Main transnational firearms trafficking flows (as defined by routes of seized firearms), 2016-17




Figure 1: Selected transnational firearms trafficking flows (Global UNODC, 2010)

The Odessa Network

The Odessa network refers to an arms flow that allegedly transports firearms, often illicitly, from Ukraine’s Oktyabrsk port to a variety of high-value targets in the Middle East. This report was published in 2013 by an American non-profit organization called C4ADS. The report’s references to illicit activities specifically point to those that could be perceived as contrary to accepted international norms, not to imply violation of any international laws or agreements.

A prominent example of these supposed targets include Syria, aiding the the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War. Other destinations included Iraq, Libya, and the DRC. The report suggests that the port is functionally controlled by Russia, with its operators directly linked to Russian oligarchs. Further, Russian and EU-affiliated shipping companies (Briese Schifffahrts and its subsidiary BBC Chartering, and Balchart) are known to be transporting sensitive, large shipments to and from this port. A network of Latvian and Panamamian shell corporations previously used by Hezbollah and the Sinaloa Cartel are linked to money laundering that enables this flow.

The global interconnectedness of this possible network provides a key example of how transnational illicit flows can fund areas of armed conflict around the world. Ideas examined in this report were somewhat supported by the 2020 UNODC Global Study on Firearms Trafficking report that found “Ukraine registered significant proportions of assembled and converted arms” in “incomplete” records of seizure data.

United States of America

The topic of Gun trade and Gun Control is a highly controversial debate in the United States. USA’s gun laws are strongly influenced by the National Rifle Association of America, NRA for short. The NRA is the leading gun rights organization in the United States. It claims a membership of nearly five million target shooters, hunters, gun collectors, gunsmiths, police, and other gun enthusiasts. The NRA believes that strong gun control laws are infringements of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and a grave threat to individual liberty. It firmly believes that gun-control measures would not have prevented violence and that mass shootings could have been avoided or mitigated if more bystanders or victims had carried guns with which to intervene or defend themselves. The NRA is one of the largest lobbyists for loose gun controls in states, a prominent example of this power being the 1993 Dickey Amendment shutdown. The net result of this allows the proliferation of a loosely-regulated legal market that sows the seeds for the development of a corresponding illicit market.

The method through which smugglers are able to transport their product domestically is through the use of route called the Iron Pipeline. The Iron Pipeline is the route in the United States used to smuggle weapons from ten states mostly in the Southern United States to Mid-Atlantic states and New England, particularly states with stricter gun laws such as New York and New Jersey. However, the use of the Iron Pipeline is not limited to the US.

There are many countries that are involved in this web of illicit dealings, a primary example for which is Mexico. Every year, half a million weapons enter Mexico illegally from the U.S., and many of them are military-style weapons that end up in the hands of drug cartels and other violent criminals. 70% to 90% of guns recovered at crime scenes in Mexico can be traced back to the U.S, according to Jim Moran.

Drug cartels, in particular, buy those weapons in the U.S., mostly in Texas or Arizona, and smuggle them across the border. It is done through a technique called the straw purchase. Gun smugglers are known to coerce or pay U.S. residents or citizens to purchase semi-automatic rifles and other firearms from gun shops or gun shows and then transfer them to a cartel

representative. This exchange is known as a straw purchase.

The ATF suggested that gun shows, thefts and private sales may be a greater source of trafficked Mexican guns than licensed dealers. According to the Mexican government, at least 17,000 homicides in 2019 were linked to arms trafficking and estimate that more than 2.5 million guns have crossed the southern border of the United States in the last decade. Further, in response to a 2009 GAO report, the DHS pointed out that the "majority" were 3,480 U.S. origin guns of 4,000 successfully traceable by ATF. These were the arms investigated out a total of 30,000 firearms seized in Mexico 2004 to 2008.

As a result, the Mexican government recently filed a lawsuit against major U.S. arms manufacturers and distributors in federal court in Boston, arguing their negligent business practices have sparked bloodshed in Mexico by marketing to the country's criminal underworld, "facilitating the unlawful trafficking of their guns to drug cartels.". However, these lawsuits are futile since President George W. Bush signed into law the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, or PLCAA, gun makers have enjoyed immunity from lawsuits because it shields them from liability when their arms are used in deadly crimes. This could form an example of the loopholes in national legislation when implementing international instruments like the Firearm Protocol.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1. How effective are the current elementary provisions in providing support in policy development, monitoring, and intelligence gathering to developing and other nations who require it?
2. What are the most significant barriers in the current implementation of the measures set out by the current international legal framework to firearm control?
3. Is there any role of regional blocs, such as the African or European Union, in supplementing international treaties through stricter mandates on national regulation? What would be the UNODC's role in supporting such an endeavour?
4. What scope is there, if any, in leveraging current international cooperation pertaining to organized crime, to firearm control?
5. How will developing and emergent technologies aid the control of illicit firearms?

6. Is it viable to prescribe technically-specific universal security measures and protocols in international treaties? If so, how would this be accomplished?
7. How will the prevention of illicit firearm trafficking affect regional markets? How must this be considered in this resolution?
8. How viable would certain universal restrictions on civilian access to firearms be feasible, and would this infringe on personal freedoms promised by national constitutions?
9. In the context of firearms control, are the differences between terrorism and organized crime relevant? Moreover, do such differences merit a difference in policy approaches, and how?

Rules of Procedure

The importance of procedure in an MUN cannot be overstated. Not only do they provide a unique opportunity to learn about the rules themselves, and how to construct meaningful debate within the framework they provide, but they also allow member states equitable representation and recognition in committee, allowing for a just and realistic simulation of a UN conference. The ability to speak up in committee is nothing short of a right, especially in one like the UNEA - procedural rules guarantee those rights. As with most conferences, this committee will model UNA-USA procedure.

Roll Call and Voting Stances

The first instance of formal procedure in your MUN conference is your roll call. Delegates are allowed one of two voting stances, if they are present in committee: "Present", and "Present and Voting". The sole difference between the two is the privilege of abstinence when voting on draft resolutions is offered only to those who vote "Present". A delegate who has voted "Present and Voting" will be required to provide a vote on a draft resolution. Note that delegates can change their voting stance from "Present" to "Present and Voting" but not vice-versa. Said voting stances have no bearing on procedural votes: all delegates present in committee will have to participate on procedural votes. Abstentions on substantive votes (resolutions and press statements) do not count for or against the passage of a given motion, nor do they affect the majority threshold needed for said passage.

The committee moves into the General Speaker's List after Roll Call, where individual delegates are invited to speak for 90 seconds on the agenda at hand, with whatever focus, breadth, or

special emphasis they so choose. Remaining time may be redistributed to the committee through *yields*. If a delegate exceeds their allotted time, the Chair will call the speaker to order. However, the Chair, at their discretion, may allow delegates to complete their thoughts beyond their speaking time, but this is generally not entertained for GSL statements.

The General Speaker's List is expected to continue throughout the conference, with breaks in between for moderated caucuses, unmoderated caucuses, and voting procedures. Procedurally, the exhaustion of the Speaker's List is indicative of the end of discussion and will leave the Executive Board with no choice but to dissolve the congregation, and will mean the end of your conference. Therefore, it is strongly encouraged that delegates be proactive with their GSL speeches to ensure that such a measure is not enacted prematurely.

Yields

Yield to the Chair: A delegate may yield the remainder of their speaking to the Chair if they do not wish to entertain input of any kind from delegates or the Executive Board, thereby returning such time to Committee Staff.

Yield to Questions: Questioners will be recognized by the Chair. Delegates may only ask one question when they are selected by the Chair—follow-up questions are not permitted, but may be allowed selectively by the discretion of the Executive Board to benefit committee proceedings. The Chair will call to order delegates whose questions are rhetorical, leading, and/or not designed to elicit information. The speaker may refuse to answer a question at their discretion, or answer through a chit passed to the questioner via the Executive Board. Only the speaker's answer is considered when counting down the yielded speaking time.

Yield to Comments: Commenters will be recognized by the Chair, and will be offered a fixed time limit for their comments. Comments must address the speech just completed to be in order.

Yield to Another Delegate: Delegates may yield their time to another delegate in committee to make a statement separate from their own, although all the time yielded to this delegate is expected to be used. No further yields on this secondary speech are encouraged, with any remaining time being dissolved in favour of committee progression. It follows that points are also generally discouraged for the same, but can be permitted by the discretion of the Chair under specific circumstances.

Points

Point of Personal Privilege: Whenever a delegate experiences personal discomfort or danger, which impairs their ability to participate in the proceedings, they may rise to a Point of Personal Privilege. Note that delegates are not required to raise such points to correct discomforts that they may correct on their own accord, such as a request to use the restroom, drink water, et cetera. In such cases, the delegate should leave committee without interrupting committee proceedings by seeking permission from the Executive Board.

Point of Order: During the discussion of any matter, a delegate may rise to a Point of Order to indicate an instance of improper procedure, without interrupting a speaker. The Chair will rule on the Point of Order in a manner that best facilitates debate. A delegate rising to a Point of Order may not speak on the substance of the matter currently under discussion.

Point of Parliamentary Inquiry: When the floor is open, a delegate may rise to a Point of Parliamentary Inquiry to ask the Chair a question regarding the Rules of Procedure. A Point of Parliamentary Inquiry may not interrupt a speaker.

Right to Reply: A delegate whose national or personal integrity has been impugned by another delegate may move for a Right of Reply. The Chair will grant the Right of Reply at their discretion with fixed speaking time.

Moderated Caucuses

Moderated Caucuses allow delegates to discuss specific aspects of the issue at hand in an organized fashion. The motion to open a moderated caucus procedurally includes the allotted speaking time, the topic, and the number of speakers. Such a motion requires a simple majority of those in attendance to pass. Yields are not permitted on leftover speaking time in a moderated caucus. In the event of a recognition issue, a motion to extend a moderated caucus can be made by any delegate in committee, which must be passed by a simple majority to go forward. The standard period for extension is half the length of the original caucus, with the same speaking time, with therefore, half the number of delegates recognized to speak.

Unmoderated Caucuses

A delegate may move for an unmoderated caucus at any time when the floor is open. The delegate making the motion must specify a time limit, not exceeding twenty minutes. At the Chair's discretion, the motion will be put to a vote, requiring a simple majority to pass. In the

case of multiple motions for unmoderated caucuses, the Chair will order the motions in ascending order of length. During an unmoderated caucus, delegates may leave their seats or possibly the committee room in order to lobby in a more informal setting or to collaborate on working papers and draft resolutions.

Documentation

A working paper must be formatted as a resolution paper, and must be approved by the Dais before delegates may refer to it in a speech. Working papers require no signatories or votes but may have authors listed.

As a rule of thumb, a draft resolution requires the number of signatories to match at least a third of those in attendance to be submitted to the Chair for approval. Signatories do not necessarily support a draft resolution and have no rights or obligations, but merely wish to see the draft resolution discussed in committee; therefore, a delegate may be a signatory of multiple draft resolutions. Once a draft resolution has been approved, a delegate may move to introduce the draft resolution, which can be passed by simple majority. In the event of bloc formation, only one draft resolution may be passed, after which committee ends.

Upon discussion of a draft resolution, the sponsors discuss its details and are subject to a question-and-answer session at the behest of committee and possibly, a combination of friendly and unfriendly amendments. Delegates may amend any draft resolution that has been introduced by adding to, deleting from, or revising parts of it.

Once the discussion of all draft resolutions is tabled, as completed by successive motions to do so, the committee moves on their voting. The order in which they are voted upon is the same as that in which they were debated in committee. It should be noted that this can be altered before the discussion of draft resolutions through a motion to Reorder the Draft Resolutions.

Position Papers

Position papers are a representation of one's background research, external knowledge, and writing prowess. They enable Delegates to clearly state their stance on the agenda, and support it with current-day contexts, comprising preexisting challenges and the recommendation of thorough, efficient solutions to address the same. Writing a position paper is highly recommended in this committee, as it will leverage one's points, and one's delegation's perspective and expectations wholly to its maximum advantage pre-committee, and during committee, thus providing Delegates with an academic edge over their fellow competitors.

Delegates must explicitly deliberate on possible points, and a firm stance on the agenda with full relevance to their country's foreign policy (violation of the same will be considered unsatisfactory as per committee guidelines).

Key Points

- Papers must not exceed 1.5 pages (excluding a bibliography).
- To maintain uniformity in all papers, the font must be Times New Roman, size 12.
- A bibliography is compulsory to ensure content is unique and fully original.
- Refrain from writing generic content about your delegation, and irrelevant historical context which has little to no pertinence to the agenda.
- Refer to yourself in third person, from the communication perspective of your Delegation, e.g, "The Delegate of Germany", "The Delegation of Germany", "Germany".
- Try to eliminate redundancy in your body paragraph to achieve the highest level of clarity, and make a substantial impact in your paper.

Format:

1. Begin your position paper by addressing the Executive Board, e.g, "Dear Executive Board" or "Dear Chairpersons".
2. Your first paragraph must be introductory in nature. Give brief, concise descriptions of your country's stance on the agenda, and a few general lines on your Delegation, and a little context justifying what your Delegation wishes to achieve respective to this agenda, both from committee, and from other Delegations (This paragraph may also include introductory content on the severity and prevalence of the agenda).
3. The remainder of your body should be split into 2 paragraphs:
 - a. Past actions and challenges: What problems has your country faced while handling this agenda on a national scale? Have they contributed to the legal implementation of newer, more efficient mechanisms? If not, what has been the impact of this issue at hand, both regionally and nationally?
 - b. Solutions: This paragraph must have clear-cut, precise content which conveys ideas regarding how to address the presented problems on an international scale, supported by efforts in your country and their results. This should also serve as a message to the committee, on what you, representing your delegation, wish to bring to the table in terms of ideas, and how your country will involve itself in solving the issue during the committee.

Note that a conclusion is not necessary, but optional, if it provides any more relevant content, other than a summation of points you have previously discussed in your Position paper.

The deadline for the submission of position papers is on OR before the first day of committee (14th October, 2022). Delegates are allowed to submit their position papers either as a hard copy during committee session on Day 1, or as soft copies beforehand, via an email to the Executive Board.

Delegates are required to submit position papers in order to be considered for placements.

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References

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